Saturday, 19 November 2016

Greece 2016: Tragedy and Resistance.



Since it’s near bankruptcy in 2009, EU and international creditors have subjected Greece to a relentless neoliberal experiment in forced economic restructuring.  A series of austerity packages have resulted in an economic and social collapse reflected in Depression era economic statistics.   Spend any time outside the well-known tourist areas and the reality of this becomes all too obvious. From the homeless on the streets of Athens to the rows of closed shops that you see as you walk round any provincial town.  Each one testimony to a small family business destroyed and lives turned upside down. Listen to the daily TV reports of crisis related suicides – 4 in the 2 day of writing this.  Talk to people even in remote mountain villages like mine and you hear stories of families separated by migration as young people leave driven by lack of hope. Or of the elderly and sick struggling to get essential medicines and treatment. Our local hospital recently put out an appeal for sheets and blankets.  Worse still watch in horror TV reports of the eviction of a care home forced into bankruptcy by the new foreclosure law.  The elderly and frail carried out on to the street of an Athens’ suburb and left dazed and confused amidst relatives, as bailiffs seize the property and medical equipment.


 How has a government of the radical left, elected on a clear anti-austerity programme found itself the agent of such economic and social devastation? Only two days after winning a massive 60% vote of confidence in last July’s referendum, Alexis Tsipras capitulated and accepted all the so called “reforms” demanded by Greece’s Troika of creditor institutions (EU, ECB and IMF) in return for a third tranche of bailout funding.  The scale of its retreat was staggering. Not only did the Syriza government agree to all the tax rises, pension cuts and additional austerity measures it had resisted so powerfully for six months, it also agreed the hand-over of remaining state-owned assets to a “Privatisation Fund” overseen by Troika technocrats.  In a move that effectively undermined Greece’s status as an autonomous sovereign state Tsipras accepted a Troika veto over major aspects of Greek law making.


Tsipras’s climb down has totally transformed the political climate in Greece. I was lucky enough to witness the events leading up to last year’s magnificent “Oxi” referendum. The mass demonstration in Athens on July 3, the politicisation of everyday life as people saw first-hand the class arrogance of Europe’s political elite, debate and discussion everywhere in cafes, shops around family meal tables was all reminiscent of the Scottish Independence referendum; but sharper, more radical.  Today the radical mood has imploded. Voter apathy abounds with recent polls showing 40% would abstain.  Even among political activists there is a worrying level of disillusion and disorientation.  Syriza’s popularity has slumped to the mid-teens, right wing New Democracy has been the main beneficiary polling over 20% recently, whilst the fascist Golden Dawn still lingers in the wings as the third largest party in parliament.


Syriza’s defeat: Strategic withdrawal or sell-out?



Syriza is the only European example of a radical left government elected on a programme to directly confront the neoliberal consensus.  Understanding the reasons for its retreat is important.   It has implications for the fight against neoliberalism and right wing nationalism throughout Europe as well as the future prospects for a radical alternative in Greece.  It is simply not enough to denounce Tsipras as a class collaborator or write off Syriza as “left reformist” and consequently predestined to fail: the position of many on the UK far left.  Syriza’s climb down after the July 2015 referendum needs to be set in context.  Neither Alexis Tsipras nor Syriza were responsible for the financial crisis that overwhelmed the Greek economy and most of western capitalism!  The crisis and what Michael Roberts has called “the Long Depression” that has followed represent capitalism’s historic failure to address a long term decline in profitability. 


Nor can we blame the Syriza government for the devastation inflicted on Greece by the series of bailout programmes agreed since 2008 and championed by Greece’s home-grown oligarchy along with their political and media friends.  In an approach best characterised by what David Harvey calls “a process of accumulation by dispossession” Greece has been subject to a massive set of “structural reforms” aimed at  restoring profit rates and reviving Greek capitalism. These have operated at 4 levels within the Greek economy:
  • The transfer of Greek financial institutions to foreign ownership.
  • The destruction of small scale and “inefficient” private sector businesses.
  • An increase in the exploitation of labour through draconian labour discipline, mass unemployment, the dismantling of welfare provisions, and replacing workplace protections and collective bargaining rights with precarious working conditions. 
  •   The wholesale privatisation of state assets at knock down prices mainly to foreign capital. 


The bailout funds conditional on this reform programme were not used to ameliorate the resultant social and economic devastation. More than 90% went directly to German, French, American and other European banks that had indulged in a frenzy of risky lending to Greek businesses, financial and state institutions in the run up to the 2008 crisis. 


Any criticism of Syriza must accept that Tsipras’s government tried at least to resist this process of accumulation by dispossession.  It was the only Greek government to do so. And even after it gave in, it retained popular support because of that, and was re-elected for a second time.  Syriza and its supporters on the left point to this fact and generally argue there was no alternative but to retreat in the face of European ruling class intransigence, especially the ECB’s strangulation of the Greek banking system in the weeks before the July 2015 referendum. This was a strategic retreat to keep open the possibility of debt relief, whilst trying to mitigate the worst effects of the new austerity measures.  They see themselves as fighting a classic “war of manoeuvre” which will allow them to move forward with their radical agenda when the balance of class forces is more favourable.  Syriza’s advocates point to the fact that, within the austerity programme, Tsipras’s government has been able to implement some mildly progressive social policies such as legalising same sex relationships, citizenship for migrant children and a degree of prison reform.


But this leadership narrative needs to be treated with considerable scepticism in the light of Syriza’s political trajectory over the last 18 months.  Stathis Kouvelakis , a former member of the party’s central committee argues that initially there was no “sell out”, but a wrong strategy led to a defeat and subsequently to Syriza’s political degeneration:


The retreat at the Eurogroup was not a betrayal or a sell-out. There was real confrontation. The institutions wanted to bring the Syriza government to its knees—because it is a real threat to them. But the Syriza government followed a wrong strategy—and to overcome that we need to tell the truth. And the fact that it presented its retreat almost as a success is in a way more serious than the retreat itself. It prepares the ground for further defeat.” (My emphasis)

It's hard to disagree with this analysis. Effectively the strategy involved pursuing an anti-austerity programme and demanding debt relief, whilst at the same time maintaining Eurozone membership.  It underpinned Tsipras’s election campaign and the approach taken to the subsequent bailout negotiations. To an extent this “wrong strategy” was understandable.  For historical reasons staying within the EU and the euro was massively popular amongst the Greek electorate. (It still has majority support in all recent polls).  Syriza felt its electoral strategy had to recognise this political reality. At the same time even mainstream economists had criticised the economic illiteracy of Troika demands for ever more austerity and structural reform.   Syriza’s strategy was not however just based on Greek political realities and the irrationality of Troika economics.   The leadership had a naïve faith in EU “solidarity” and in the potential to reform Eurozone policy making through strategic political alliances within the EU institutions.  This meant Tsipras’s and other leaders continually opposed calls from the left to prepare alternative plans should the negotiations go wrong.

As Kouvelakis says, none of this was the product of political degeneration or class collaboration or other far left shibboleth. Much of it did not go uncontested within Syriza at the time. Alternative strategies were possible and were discussed. Debt cancellation and leaving the euro was the most obvious.  But this would have meant breaking EU rules and risking a forced Grexit; something Tsipras and key leaders were politically unable to countenance. Those within Syriza who recognised this strategic weakness were not sufficiently united or organised to challenge the leadership strategy.


Any radical left government can expect defeats and set-backs.  But a genuinely radical left leadership should always confront the political circumstances it finds itself in, reassess the situation and, if forced to retreat, at least do so in a manner which lays the basis to take the struggle forward in the future.  Unfortunately Syriza did not do this.  It is this, more than the defeat itself that marks the beginning of its degeneration as a party of the radical left. Since then Syriza has become increasingly indistinguishable from mainstream social democracy. It has accepted its subaltern role.  It has fully and faithfully implemented policies it was elected to oppose and it has justified them on the basis that “there is no alternative” to neoliberal solutions.


Finance minister Euclid Tsakalatos’s speech to Syriza’s October conference perfectly encapsulated what his government has become.  Referring to the latest tax rises, pension cuts and reduction in minimum wages, he acknowledged that the poor would suffer most.  He confirmed that living standards for the majority of ordinary citizens would fall further and economic growth would be held back. But he argued that the debt relief that might follow:


 “will be a signal to the markets …… and so investors can invest long-term. This can offset the recessionary measures that we take”. 


Effectively a government that came to power promising a radical redistribution of wealth and power to the benefit of working class people, ends up defending the standard neoliberal consensus. Tsakalatos justifies sacrifices by those least able to pay as a price worth paying to placate financial markets, boost inward investment and restore profit rates.    


Sparks of Resistance


Lessons from the Syriza debacle have been hotly debated within the European and Greek radical left.  I would make only three main points.  Firstly a radical left government is bound to make tactical and strategic mistakes.  Dealing with these requires open and honest assessment and the widest possible democratic debate within the party and the wider social movements from which it draws its support.  


Secondly whatever else we may conclude about Syriza’s experience in government, it showed that a radical left alternative to neoliberalism can gain mass popular support. The political consensus of the last 30 years is falling apart.  The result does not have to be the reactionary populism of Brexit or Trump.


Thirdly and more importantly Greek people continue to suffer and, despite disorientation and disillusion, continue to resist.  Having declined since the mass mobilisations of 2011 – 12, there are signs that popular opposition is rising again. Workplace struggle is not yet on the scale of previous years but it has not gone away. Health workers took strike action in early October as a result of deteriorating pay and conditions and in opposition to further cuts in the health service.  Prior to that workers struck against the impact of water privatisation in Thessaloniki and Athens. In a significant escalation of opposition to Syriza’s austerity measures, the main civil servants’ union has called a general strike across the public sector for November 24 and urged private sector unions to join them.  State education has been cut to the bone prompting campaigns by teacher unions for increased staffing and restoration of funding cuts.


Outside the workplace, pensioners continue to oppose further pension cuts on top of the 40% reductions imposed over recent years. The sight of riot police teargassing them and baring their way to parliament during a demonstration in September was another indication of Syriza’s political transformation. As was the same police response to thousands of students, trade unionists and members of radical left groups who defied bans on protests outside Parliament during Obama’s recent visit.   Anti-racist and anti-fascist campaigners have linked up with trade unionists, those organising refugee support and parent groups to demand access to state education for refugee children. Local community solidarity networks providing welfare, health and community services remain a vital source of support in many working class areas devastated by the demolition of essential public services. They too are an aspect of resistance to the processes of “accumulation by dispossession”.  Just as importantly they provide “prefigurative” examples of direct democracy and alternative modes of production and distribution.


Finally campaigns opposing privatisation have re-emerged.  Most notably the one led by Zoe Constantopoulou, former Speaker of Parliament, aimed at stopping the sale of the old Athens Airport site to private developers for a huge retail and luxury residential complex.  Former Syriza MP Eleni Portaliou argues that such campaigns are not just about resisting privatisation.   They raise far more important issues about what is happening in Greece. Greek state assets are being seized and privatised to pay off “odious and illegitimate” debt. Such “confiscations” are the clearest possible indication of Greece’s status as an EU “debt colony”. As such they have the potential to rebuild a much broader social movement and help reconfigure the radical left in Greece following Syriza’s political collapse.


These and similar struggles demand and deserve international solidarity. In Scotland we can take immediate steps by getting our union branches, community campaigns and political organisations to affiliate to and work with organisations like the Greece Solidarity Campaign, the various refugee campaigns and others providing material and activist support to the people of Greece.  But the best solidarity the left can offer is to embrace the vision of collectivism and resistance represented by these struggles, and build our own mass movement against both European neoliberalism and the reactionary populism of Trump and Brexit.


The struggle of the Greek people is also our struggle. Together we can win!


Το αγονα του Ελληνικού λαού είναι και δικό μας! Μαζί θα νικήσουμε!













References

Michael Roberts:  The Long depression, Haymarket 2016

David Harvey: 17 Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, Profile Publishers 2015

Stathis Kouvelakis:

Clinging to Power


Syriza Rise and Fall, NLR Jan / Feb 2016

Eleni Portaliou – Greece a country for sale, Jacobin Magazine Sept 2016


Michael Neradakis – Creditors Destroy Greece, Syriza does not resist http://www.defenddemocracy.press/

Dimosthenis Papadatos Anagnostopoulos  http://rednotebook.gr/



Euclid Tsakalatos – Speech to Second syriza conference, Athens 14 Oct 2016

Alexis Tsipras – Speech to Second Syriza Conference, Athens Oct 2016

Panagiotis Sotiris – The Dream that became a nightmare – Jacobin Feb 2016

JK Galbraith (https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/imf-greece-debt-restructuring-by-james-k-galbraith-2015-06?barrier=true

Panos Garganos: Socialist Worker (UK) 25/10/2016

Greece 2016: Tragedy and Resistance.




Since it’s near bankruptcy in 2009, EU and international creditors have subjected Greece to a relentless neoliberal experiment in forced economic restructuring.  A series of austerity packages have resulted in an economic and social collapse reflected in Depression era economic statistics.   Spend any time outside the well-known tourist areas and the reality of this becomes all too obvious. From the homeless on the streets of Athens to the rows of closed shops that you see as you walk round any provincial town.  Each one testimony to a small family business destroyed and lives turned upside down. Listen to the daily TV reports of crisis related suicides – 4 in the 2 day of writing this.  Talk to people even in remote mountain villages like mine and you hear stories of families separated by migration as young people leave driven by lack of hope. Or of the elderly and sick struggling to get essential medicines and treatment. Our local hospital recently put out an appeal for sheets and blankets.  Worse still watch in horror TV reports of the eviction of a care home forced into bankruptcy by the new foreclosure law.  The elderly and frail carried out on to the street of an Athens’ suburb and left dazed and confused amidst relatives, as bailiffs seize the property and medical equipment.

 How has a government of the radical left, elected on a clear anti-austerity programme found itself the agent of such economic and social devastation? Only two days after winning a massive 60% vote of confidence in last July’s referendum, Alexis Tsipras capitulated and accepted all the so called “reforms” demanded by Greece’s Troika of creditor institutions (EU, ECB and IMF) in return for a third tranche of bailout funding.  The scale of its retreat was staggering. Not only did the Syriza government agree to all the tax rises, pension cuts and additional austerity measures it had resisted so powerfully for six months, it also agreed the hand-over of remaining state-owned assets to a “Privatisation Fund” overseen by Troika technocrats.  In a move that effectively undermined Greece’s status as an autonomous sovereign state Tsipras accepted a Troika veto over major aspects of Greek law making.

Tsipras’s climb down has totally transformed the political climate in Greece. I was lucky enough to witness the events leading up to last year’s magnificent “Oxi” referendum. The mass demonstration in Athens on July 3, the politicisation of everyday life as people saw first-hand the class arrogance of Europe’s political elite, debate and discussion everywhere in cafes, shops around family meal tables was all reminiscent of the Scottish Independence referendum; but sharper, more radical.  Today the radical mood has imploded. Voter apathy abounds with recent polls showing 40% would abstain.  Even among political activists there is a worrying level of disillusion and disorientation.  Syriza’s popularity has slumped to the mid-teens, right wing New Democracy has been the main beneficiary polling over 20% recently, whilst the fascist Golden Dawn still lingers in the wings as the third largest party in parliament.

Syriza’s defeat: Strategic withdrawal or sell-out?


Syriza is the only European example of a radical left government elected on a programme to directly confront the neoliberal consensus.  Understanding the reasons for its retreat is important.   It has implications for the fight against neoliberalism and right wing nationalism throughout Europe as well as the future prospects for a radical alternative in Greece.  It is simply not enough to denounce Tsipras as a class collaborator or write off Syriza as “left reformist” and consequently predestined to fail: the position of many on the UK far left.  Syriza’s climb down after the July 2015 referendum needs to be set in context.  Neither Alexis Tsipras nor Syriza were responsible for the financial crisis that overwhelmed the Greek economy and most of western capitalism!  The crisis and what Michael Roberts has called “the Long Depression” that has followed represent capitalism’s historic failure to address a long term decline in profitability. 

Nor can we blame the Syriza government for the devastation inflicted on Greece by the series of bailout programmes agreed since 2008 and championed by Greece’s home-grown oligarchy along with their political and media friends.  In an approach best characterised by what David Harvey calls “a process of accumulation by dispossession” Greece has been subject to a massive set of “structural reforms” aimed at  restoring profit rates and reviving Greek capitalism. These have operated at 4 levels within the Greek economy:
  • The transfer of Greek financial institutions to foreign ownership.
  • The destruction of small scale and “inefficient” private sector businesses.
  • An increase in the exploitation of labour through draconian labour discipline, mass  unemployment, the dismantling of welfare provisions, and replacing workplace protections and collective bargaining rights with precarious working conditions. 
  • The wholesale privatisation of state assets at knock down prices mainly to foreign capital. 


The bailout funds conditional on this reform programme were not used to ameliorate the resultant social and economic devastation. More than 90% went directly to German, French, American and other European banks that had indulged in a frenzy of risky lending to Greek businesses, financial and state institutions in the run up to the 2008 crisis. 

Any criticism of Syriza must accept that Tsipras’s government tried at least to resist this process of accumulation by dispossession.  It was the only Greek government to do so. And even after it gave in, it retained popular support because of that, and was re-elected for a second time.  Syriza and its supporters on the left point to this fact and generally argue there was no alternative but to retreat in the face of European ruling class intransigence, especially the ECB’s strangulation of the Greek banking system in the weeks before the July 2015 referendum. This was a strategic retreat to keep open the possibility of debt relief, whilst trying to mitigate the worst effects of the new austerity measures.  They see themselves as fighting a classic “war of manoeuvre” which will allow them to move forward with their radical agenda when the balance of class forces is more favourable.  Syriza’s advocates point to the fact that, within the austerity programme, Tsipras’s government has been able to implement some mildly progressive social policies such as legalising same sex relationships, citizenship for migrant children and a degree of prison reform.

But this leadership narrative needs to be treated with considerable scepticism in the light of Syriza’s political trajectory over the last 18 months.  Stathis Kouvelakis , a former member of the party’s central committee argues that initially there was no “sell out”, but a wrong strategy led to a defeat and subsequently to Syriza’s political degeneration:

The retreat at the Eurogroup was not a betrayal or a sell-out. There was real confrontation. The institutions wanted to bring the Syriza government to its knees—because it is a real threat to them. But the Syriza government followed a wrong strategy—and to overcome that we need to tell the truth. And the fact that it presented its retreat almost as a success is in a way more serious than the retreat itself. It prepares the ground for further defeat.” (My emphasis)

It's hard to disagree with this analysis. Effectively the strategy involved pursuing an anti-austerity programme and demanding debt relief, whilst at the same time maintaining Eurozone membership.  It underpinned Tsipras’s election campaign and the approach taken to the subsequent bailout negotiations. To an extent this “wrong strategy” was understandable.  For historical reasons staying within the EU and the euro was massively popular amongst the Greek electorate. (It still has majority support in all recent polls).  Syriza felt its electoral strategy had to recognise this political reality. At the same time even mainstream economists had criticised the economic illiteracy of Troika demands for ever more austerity and structural reform.   Syriza’s strategy was not however just based on Greek political realities and the irrationality of Troika economics.   The leadership had a naïve faith in EU “solidarity” and in the potential to reform Eurozone policy making through strategic political alliances within the EU institutions.  This meant Tsipras’s and other leaders continually opposed calls from the left to prepare alternative plans should the negotiations go wrong.


As Kouvelakis says, none of this was the product of political degeneration or class collaboration or other far left shibboleth. Much of it did not go uncontested within Syriza at the time. Alternative strategies were possible and were discussed. Debt cancellation and leaving the euro was the most obvious.  But this would have meant breaking EU rules and risking a forced Grexit; something Tsipras and key leaders were politically unable to countenance. Those within Syriza who recognised this strategic weakness were not sufficiently united or organised to challenge the leadership strategy.


Any radical left government can expect defeats and set-backs.  But a genuinely radical left leadership should always confront the political circumstances it finds itself in, reassess the situation and, if forced to retreat, at least do so in a manner which lays the basis to take the struggle forward in the future.  Unfortunately Syriza did not do this.  It is this, more than the defeat itself that marks the beginning of its degeneration as a party of the radical left. Since then Syriza has become increasingly indistinguishable from mainstream social democracy. It has accepted its subaltern role.  It has fully and faithfully implemented policies it was elected to oppose and it has justified them on the basis that “there is no alternative” to neoliberal solutions.

Finance minister Euclid Tsakalatos’s speech to Syriza’s October conference perfectly encapsulated what his government has become.  Referring to the latest tax rises, pension cuts and reduction in minimum wages, he acknowledged that the poor would suffer most.  He confirmed that living standards for the majority of ordinary citizens would fall further and economic growth would be held back. But he argued that the debt relief that might follow:

 “will be a signal to the markets …… and so investors can invest long-term. This can offset the recessionary measures that we take”. 

Effectively a government that came to power promising a radical redistribution of wealth and power to the benefit of working class people, ends up defending the standard neoliberal consensus. Tsakalatos justifies sacrifices by those least able to pay as a price worth paying to placate financial markets, boost inward investment and restore profit rates.    

Sparks of Resistance


Lessons from the Syriza debacle have been hotly debated within the European and Greek radical left.  I would make only three main points.  Firstly a radical left government is bound to make tactical and strategic mistakes.  Dealing with these requires open and honest assessment and the widest possible democratic debate within the party and the wider social movements from which it draws its support.  

Secondly whatever else we may conclude about Syriza’s experience in government, it showed that a radical left alternative to neoliberalism can gain mass popular support. The political consensus of the last 30 years is falling apart.  The result does not have to be the reactionary populism of Brexit or Trump.

Thirdly and more importantly Greek people continue to suffer and, despite disorientation and disillusion, continue to resist.  Having declined since the mass mobilisations of 2011 – 12, there are signs that popular opposition is rising again. Workplace struggle is not yet on the scale of previous years but it has not gone away. Health workers took strike action in early October as a result of deteriorating pay and conditions and in opposition to further cuts in the health service.  Prior to that workers struck against the impact of water privatisation in Thessaloniki and Athens. In a significant escalation of opposition to Syriza’s austerity measures, the main civil servants’ union has called a general strike across the public sector for November 24 and urged private sector unions to join them.  State education has been cut to the bone prompting campaigns by teacher unions for increased staffing and restoration of funding cuts.

Outside the workplace, pensioners continue to oppose further pension cuts on top of the 40% reductions imposed over recent years. The sight of riot police teargassing them and baring their way to parliament during a demonstration in September was another indication of Syriza’s political transformation. As was the same police response to thousands of students, trade unionists and members of radical left groups who defied bans on protests outside Parliament during Obama’s recent visit.   Anti-racist and anti-fascist campaigners have linked up with trade unionists, those organising refugee support and parent groups to demand access to state education for refugee children. Local community solidarity networks providing welfare, health and community services remain a vital source of support in many working class areas devastated by the demolition of essential public services. They too are an aspect of resistance to the processes of “accumulation by dispossession”.  Just as importantly they provide “prefigurative” examples of direct democracy and alternative modes of production and distribution.

Finally campaigns opposing privatisation have re-emerged.  Most notably the one led by Zoe Constantopoulou, former Speaker of Parliament, aimed at stopping the sale of the old Athens Airport site to private developers for a huge retail and luxury residential complex.  Former Syriza MP Eleni Portaliou argues that such campaigns are not just about resisting privatisation.   They raise far more important issues about what is happening in Greece. Greek state assets are being seized and privatised to pay off “odious and illegitimate” debt. Such “confiscations” are the clearest possible indication of Greece’s status as an EU “debt colony”. As such they have the potential to rebuild a much broader social movement and help reconfigure the radical left in Greece following Syriza’s political collapse.

These and similar struggles demand and deserve international solidarity. In Scotland we can take immediate steps by getting our union branches, community campaigns and political organisations to affiliate to and work with organisations like the Greece Solidarity Campaign, the various refugee campaigns and others providing material and activist support to the people of Greece.  But the best solidarity the left can offer is to embrace the vision of collectivism and resistance represented by these struggles, and build our own mass movement against both European neoliberalism and the reactionary populism of Trump and Brexit.

The struggle of the Greek people is also our struggle. Together we can win!

Το αγονα του Ελληνικού λαού είναι και δικό μας! Μαζί θα νικήσουμε!













References

Michael Roberts:  The Long depression, Haymarket 2016

David Harvey: 17 Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, Profile Publishers 2015

Stathis Kouvelakis:

Clinging to Power


Syriza Rise and Fall, NLR Jan / Feb 2016

Eleni Portaliou – Greece a country for sale, Jacobin Magazine Sept 2016


Michael Neradakis – Creditors Destroy Greece, Syriza does not resist http://www.defenddemocracy.press/

Dimosthenis Papadatos Anagnostopoulos  http://rednotebook.gr/



Euclid Tsakalatos – Speech to Second syriza conference, Athens 14 Oct 2016

Alexis Tsipras – Speech to Second Syriza Conference, Athens Oct 2016

Panagiotis Sotiris – The Dream that became a nightmare – Jacobin Feb 2016

JK Galbraith (https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/imf-greece-debt-restructuring-by-james-k-galbraith-2015-06?barrier=true

Panos Garganos: Socialist Worker (UK) 25/10/2016

Tuesday, 23 August 2016

Some Thoughts on Lexit after the EU Referendum


Since the referendum the debate on the UK radical left between those who supported a “Remain” position and those arguing to leave the EU has continued.  “Lexit” proponents, claim by and large, that their predictions and strategy have been vindicated.  Typical of this was the SWP’s assertion in the immediate aftermath that:

“The vote to leave the European Union (EU) last week hasn’t just plunged the Tories and British ruling class into crisis. It has struck a blow against US imperialism and the EU bosses’ club, which imposes austerity across the continent.” (Socialist Worker 29/6/2016)

Similarly Counterfire claimed, in equally triumphalist tones, that “the rich and powerful …have suffered a massive reverse”.  And that the vote heralded an intensification of class struggle.” The Socialist Party capped even this by predicting the probable collapse of the Tory Party”.  And the result has been widely characterised within left leave circles as a “working class revolt”. This Blog examines such claims in so far as that is possible so soon after the referendum.

Most left remain supporters argued before the referendum that the Lexit case was based on blind hope rather than serious political analysis.  This was not a referendum called by a radical left government in the face of anti-democratic EU imposed austerity as was the situation in Greece during the Oxi referendum.  The UK vote was not about whether the European Union was a “businessman’s club”.  Something no one on the radical left would dispute.  Rather it was a referendum called by an overconfident prime minister as a way of managing Tory party divisions and seeing off a UKIP challenge. It was always going to be a debate between two factions of the Tory party divided over their approach to the EU and globalisation.  As a result Lexit was universally ignored and consequently unable to stop a massive shift to the right amongst poorer working class communities and the resulting rise in racism and nationalism. It was a dreadful mistake by those left groups involved.

Brexit: A Working Class Revolt?

Lexit supporters place much emphasis on polling by Tory peer Lord Ashcroft to justify two major claims.  Firstly that the Leave vote was an uprising by the poorest section of the working class and secondly that racism and xenophobia, though, part of the picture, were less important than anti-establishment anger and frustration after years of political and economic neglect.  For instance “a Socialist Party reporter” argued that the data was clear evidence that:

“The ‘Leave’ vote represented a working class revolt against the establishment. While there were differences in attitudes geographically, among different age groups, ethnic backgrounds and so on, the key determinant of how people voted was social class. “(Socialist Party Website)

Whilst Charlie Kimber (SWP National Secretary) has written:

“There was a strong class element. A detailed poll by Lord Ashcroft showed the AB social group (professionals, managers, lecturers and teachers) were the only social group where a majority, 57 percent, voted to Remain. C1s (most white collar workers) divided fairly evenly. But nearly two thirds of C2s (skilled manual workers) Ds (other manual workers) and Es (pensioners, unemployed, people on benefits) voted leave.”


Others drilled down into the Ashcroft data to discern evidence that this working class revolt was not primarily driven by racism but was indeed a radical revolt:

“Many who supported Remain, including left wingers and liberals, argue the result was fuelled by racism over immigration. But the idea that Leave was a racist vote by the “white working class” doesn’t add up. The three towns outside of London where the “White British” population is not a majority produced Leave votes. So in Luton 45 percent of the population is “White British”—it voted Leave by 56.5 percent on a 66.2 percent turnout. Similarly in Slough 34.52 percent of the population is “White British”—people there also voted Leave by 54 percent on a 62.1 percent turnout. Meanwhile in Leicester 45 percent of the population is “White British” and 48.9 percent voted for Leave on a 65 percent turnout.

People in London backed Remain more strongly, but Leave still had strong support among many working class people in the capital.”


Using the Ashcroft data in this way is tantamount to abandoning Marxism as a means of analysing the class struggle.  Struggle is always contradictory and dynamic. Using static bourgeois social categories to determine the class nature of the Brexit vote simply emphasises divisions within the working class. It is part of the ABC of socialism, that capitalism creates such divisions; gender, ethnic origin, nationality, access to educational opportunities, skill, income, part-time/ full time, permanent / temporary employment and a whole range of other subdivisions.  The role of socialists is to break down these sectional divides not laud one section of the working class and demonise others.

Without getting bogged down in Lexit psephology, it is worth pointing out that the ABC1 social categories include large numbers of teachers, nurses, doctors, college lecturers and other public sector workers.  Many of them have been involved in significant strike action recently, fighting pay cuts, defending conditions of employment and opposing redundancies. In other words they are at the forefront of the resistance to austerity.  For Marxists they are as much a part of the modern working class as unskilled factory workers and service sector workers on zero hours’ contracts. Yet Ashcroft’s poll showed they overwhelmingly voted Remain. As did most trade union members and members of the Labour Party. As did voters in every Scottish local authority (including the most deprived areas of Glasgow and the central belt).  It is also a strange working class revolt that does not include major working class centres such as West Belfast, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Bristol and London.  An even stranger one that does not include two thirds of Asian voters, 73% of Black voters and 75% of young voters the vast majority of whom are working class by any definition.  This leaves aside the fact that 2m plus working class EU migrants were denied a vote.

There is no doubt that those in social category C2DE voted by a margin of 2:1 for leave. Leaving aside that the C2 category includes some self-employed and small employers whose categorisation as “working class” is tenuous, it is obvious that a large part of this vote was driven by a desire to kick back against the establishment after years of economic and political neglect under both Tory and New Labour governments.  The geography of the largest leave votes speaks for itself. (http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/)

But this was only part of the story. Even a conservative extrapolation from the Ashcroft data shows fairly convincingly that the C2, D, E vote accounted for just short of 40% of the Leave vote. The bulk of the leave vote came from the wealthier sections of society. Some we would include in any definition of the working class, some we would not. 
( Andrew Flood. http://links.org.au/node/4739)

So any serious analysis of the nature of the referendum result gives us a picture of a working class split down the middle between Leave and Remain. Not a particularly revealing conclusion but one that lends no support to the notion that the Leave vote was an unambiguous working class revolt. However to the extent that the leave vote was a revolt of the poorest sections of the working class, the real question must be under whose leadership and what ideas lie behind it?  Neil Faulkner answers this succinctly in a recent article on Left Unity’s website:

The Brexit vote is a victory for right-wing leadership of the discontent. It is therefore a victory for the racism with which the entire Brexit campaign was laced. There is a fundamental difference between workers being led by right-wingers and racists, and workers acting for themselves in a mass movement based on class unity and class struggle.”

It is counterproductive if not delusional to try and sweep this under the carpet in order to justify wildly optimistic pre-referendum predictions.  No one on the left would suggest that all Leave voters are racist or even that the majority of those expressing anti-migrant and xenophobic sentiments are irredeemably committed racist right-wingers. Racism is endemic in capitalism. In all sections of society not just the working class.  It has a material base in the sense that people are forced to compete for jobs, homes, and public services. Working class communities impoverished, divided and angered by years of economic policies designed to suck wealth into a privileged elite, can easily be won to racist and xenophobic ideas by populists appealing to traditions of British nationalism.   The British Left has an excellent history of building resistance to fascists and racists when they appear on our streets.  But we have not had the strength or the unity to build a mass social movement within working class communities which is capable of providing a compelling alternative to the racism and reactionary nationalism pedaled by mainstream Leave politicians like Farage, Gove and Johnson.

The Ruling Class in Crisis?

Events during the two weeks following Brexit certainly felt like a major political crisis.  Within 48 hours the value of the £ and the stock market crashed, Cameron resigned, the leaders of the Brexit campaign stabbed each other in the back,  far right populists throughout Europe rushed to endorse the leave vote and call for the break-up of the EU and the Blairites launched their coup attempt against Jeremy Corbyn.  The political elite seemed to flounder and divide as it became clear there was no strategy for leaving the EU.

Two months later things are starting to look less febrile.  It is far too early to judge the economic and political impact of Brexit but we can already discern some pointers to the nature of the political crisis we face.  And again they do not seem to confirm the optimistic scenario predicted by Lexit.  The ruthless speed with which the Tory party ousted the Cameron / Osborne clique and regrouped around Theresa May seemed to stun some observers. Although it was easily predictable before the referendum for anyone not blinded by Lexit ultra leftism:


“In short if there is no evidence that the Tories are falling apart ……. talk of disarray amongst the ruling class and opportunities for socialists after a Brexit is misleading to say the least.  All the evidence suggests that the most likely scenario following a Brexit is a rejuvenated hard right Tory / UKIP government with the solid backing of key sections of the British ruling class. Socialist should never underestimate the class consciousness of our ruling elite. Current rhetorical divisions will largely melt away following a Brexit.” http://craiglewiis138.blogspot.co.uk/

 In the weeks following the vote, the Tory party has shown no sign of “falling apart”.  Socialists Worker’s lead prediction the week after the referendum that “The British ruling class is in chaos – and the Tory civil war over the European Union referendum is escalating” now looks a little premature to say the least.

A number of factors suggest that, to the extent there is a political crisis, it is one that the ruling elite are moving swiftly to control and steer to their advantage. Theresa May’s government reflects a triumph for the hard nationalist right of the Tory party.  May herself is from the authoritarian wing despite lukewarm support for remaining in the EU. Supporters of a “hard Brexit”, which sacrifices access to the Single Market in order to “regain control” over immigration, are in charge of EU negotiations along with future foreign and trade relations. Despite the rhetoric about doing something for those “left behind”, the early signals suggest a government intent on using the shock of Brexit to deepen the neoliberal, free market offensive on working people. Cuts in Corporation tax, relaxing bank regulations and restarting quantitative easing all benefit the wealthy at the expense of working class living standards.  As does pushing ahead with the Trade Union Act further eroding trade unions’ ability to protect members’ pay and conditions. In a gesture of total contempt for those “left behind” selective Grammar Schools in England will be expanded. May’s government is to press ahead with abolition the Human Rights Act.  Whilst keeping Jeremy Hunt in charge of the NHS is the best indication yet that the assault on public services will continue with renewed vigour.

Just as there is no real sign of the British ruling class falling apart, the predicted collapse of the EU seems equally elusive.  Brexit has certainly been welcomed on the European far right, with calls from the likes of Marine LePen in France, Gert Wilders in Holland and the neo-Nazis in Hungary for exit referendums.  But there is no real sign of the much forecast contagion spreading across other member states. If anything popular support for the EU has hardened since 23 June in the largest EU states as the potential economic impact of Brexit on living standards, jobs and free movement have become more apparent. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-poll-idUKKCN1002A0

Nor has the European radical left shown much sign of following Lexit in abandoning internationalism and welcoming a right-wing led British exit - with the exception of a few electorally insignificant far left groups such as Antarsya in Greece.  For instance Portugal’s Left Bloc, at its convention earlier this month, denounced the EU institutions as anti-democratic and committed itself to fighting  Troika led austerity, even if that means leaving the Euro. But asserted that Europe is a key terrain of struggle for Socialists resisting neoliberalism. For them it is as important as the national struggle. Speaking at the Convention’s closing session Catarina Martins said:


“But we never stopped affirming — nor shall we ever — that the European space is a space for the struggle of the left. We find people, movements, parties that are our people, and it is with these forces that we want to conquer the power of Brussels and Berlin.”



The Economic Impact of Brexit

Most Lexit supporters are reluctant to address the potential economic impact of Brexit on working class people. At the SWP’s Marxism event for instance Alex Callinicos, a leading member of the SWP, dismissed predictions of the likely impact on jobs, living standards and growth as mere “speculation”.  At this early stage of Brexit this is partially true. And we must always be wary that much mainstream media prediction reflects special pleading from various sections of British capitalism seeking to lobby politicians in advance of the exit process.

Also in discussing the referendum’s economic implications, it is important to set Brexit in the context of a structural crisis facing global capitalism reflected in persistently falling profit rates   A crisis which one Marxist economist calls “the Long Depression”.  Since the financial crisis workers’ living standards in the UK have fallen further than any other EU country except Greece.  But this was not caused by the EU, where most countries have seen a slight rise in living standards over the same period, nor by Brexit.  It was the culmination of ruthless policies of austerity, cuts, privatisation and attacks on trade unions pursued by successive UK governments over more than 30 years, as they struggled to restore profitability at the expense of working people.  (Michael Roberts 2016). 

Nevertheless some clear trends are emerging which suggest Brexit will compound the effects of this crisis on the very people who voted for leave in such large numbers. The falling £, rising stock markets, falling interest rates and planned cuts in private sector investment are not abstract phenomena.  They impact on the daily lives of workers through their effects on, jobs, pension scheme deficits, business takeovers, funds “repatriated” from Brussels, despite recent pledges for some sectors such as HE and Agriculture. Moreover it is hard to see access to the single market being replaced by trade agreements with China, the US, India or anywhere else without further downward pressure on UK wages and working conditions to ensure competitiveness. In designing a response to the current political situation, the left should not dismiss such economic factors. They directly impact on the ability of working people and their organisations to fightback.

How should the Left Respond?
For all the reasons outlined above, it is highly unlikely that Brexit will lead to the kind of spontaneous intensification of class struggle that Left Leave advocates anticipate.   The Tories have swiftly regrouped and all the signs are that they will continue to pursue a reactionary anti-working class agenda.  The ruling class is not yet in anything resembling a crisis, although it is clearly divided over how to resolve the long term decline of profitability within western capitalism. To the extent that the Leave vote was a revolt of the poorest sections of the working class, it is a revolt led by reactionary nationalism and racism. The radical left has not been strong enough to counteract this.

Such conclusions are of course denounced as pessimism by the Leave supporting left. But if socialists do not correctly characterise the situation we face then we will develop strategies that make no sense to the mass of working people and leave us sitting on the side-lines as events unfold.  Worse we may in consequence demoralise and deactivate the very workers and activists who must take the struggle forward. Unity on the left needs to be built urgently. But those comrades and left groups who voted Leave need to recognise that they got it horribly wrong, and stop trying to retrospectively justify their mistakes. 
Those on the left who voted remain did so for progressive reasons. To resist the poisonous nationalism and racism of the mainstream Leave campaign.  To avoid giving a boost to the emergent far right across Europe. To defend the workplace and environmental protections underpinned by EU law. To protect freedom of movement and the rights of migrant workers. And to assert and build international solidarity between those resisting austerity and neoliberalism throughout Europe. To characterise the majority of the working class who took such a progressive stance as a remote metropolitan elite is ultra-left nonsense.  We need a serious debate on the left around what some have called “transitional demands and actions” that can halt the shift to the right post Brexit and develop reforms and political spaces that start to challenge capitalism not just manage it.  That debate of course must take place within the immediate struggles we face in the aftermath of the Leave vote.


In England and Wales socialists face two key struggles. Both are defensive and result from the rightward shift in UK politics following Brexit.  In the first place we need to defend our communities from the explosion in racist attacks since the referendum. The UK Left responded quickly and decisively to the rise in race hatred following the vote. The joint Peoples Assembly and Stand Up to Racism demonstration in July pointed the way forward, and since then there have been local mobilisations throughout the country wherever the EDL or other far right groups have tried to mobilise - from Southampton to Edinburgh. But the left must urgently come to terms with the fact that racism and xenophobia is embedded in some of the poorest working class communities.   It is something that must be confronted and not glossed over as a secondary issue. As a minimum the Left should make no concessions to anti-migrant sentiment or compromise over free movement of labour.  Some confused arguments have surfaced from Lexit supports over this.  The CP for instance argues that free movement cannot be unequivocally supported because it is a product of the EU Single Market and holds down wages in receiving countries. But the answer to low pay and pressure on public services is an end to austerity, increased public spending and the restoration of free collective bargaining for trade unions.  Trying to find a left compromise with mainstream Brexit demands for immigration controls will only fuel racism and xenophobia.

Obviously the second key issue around which the left must unite is defence of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party leadership. The issue here is not just careerism or opportunism in the Labour Party.  A defeat for Corbyn will be a generational defeat for the radical left (in England and Wales at least).  The neoliberal consensus that developed over the last 30 years and the long term profit crisis of capitalism which spawned it, has hollowed out the Labour Party and removed the economic basis for social democratic reform on which it was founded.  A Corbyn led Labour Party with a clear anti-austerity and progressive agenda cannot therefore be a return to old style social democracy.  It is potentially much more significant than that.   It could provide opportunities for the radical left to develop new transitional demands and actions of the type mentioned above.  Demands and actions that can both halt the post Brexit shift to the right and open the way for genuinely transformative reforms which challenge the power of capital.  But for this to happen the radical left must actively work to ensure the movement around Corbyn develops beyond the Labour Party into a social movement embedded in workplaces and communities, linking parliamentary and extra parliamentary activity and struggle.  It must not be refocussed on internal Labour Party battles. 

Challenges for the Left in Post-Brexit Scotland
In Scotland the Lexit debate poses additional challenges for the radical left.  The overwhelming 62% majority for Remain has led to speculation about a second independence referendum. There is not hard evidence yet of a sustained increase in support for independence. Nevertheless sections of the SNP are pressing for a second independence campaign sooner rather than later, and the Scottish Greens have already launched their Indyref2 campaign.  If a second independence referendum does emerge, a revival of something like the Radical Independence Campaign will be essential.  Not just to provide a progressive vision of an Independent Scotland; but also to challenge the rightward drift of the SNP as it seeks to present a pro-business case for independence aimed at middle class “No voters” who supported Remain.   

But uniting in a revived RIC will be a major problem for the Scottish radical left.  As yet there has been little debate on this, but Lexit supporters already plan to make a Scottish EU exit central to any future Indyref2 campaign. In language not untypical of the whole Lexit debate, a left wing academic from Glasgow University recently denounced the “Europhilia” and “fake internationalism” of those on the Scottish left who supported a remain position and asserted:

“… we must argue for Indyref 2 and for a new referendum on EU membership in which the actual nature of the EU can openly be discussed” (Davidson 2016 – my emphasis)
Following the overwhelming endorsement of EU membership in Scotland, it is hard to see how such a strategy can have much appeal outside political academia.  As one of the current candidates for depute leader of the SNP recently put it:

 “The possibility of a second independence referendum is predicated upon the constitutional outrage of Scotland being taken out of the EU against the wishes of the people who live here”. (Tommy Sheppard)
If therefore, as seems likely, a further EU referendum in Scotland does not happen, where would that leave the Lexit Left?  Having denied that the EU can ever be a terrain of struggle for socialists, they cannot with any degree of credibility join with others on the Left in support of a radical vision of Scottish Independence which accepts Scotland remaining in the European Union.  Presumably under those circumstances Lexit comrades must argue that Scotland is “better together” with a post Brexit UK dominated by the politics of right-wing nationalism.  Such is the hole they have dug for themselves.



Additional references:

Michael Roberts:         The Long Depression, How it happened, Why it happened, And what happens next, Haymarket 2016.

Tom Sheppard:            45%+62% = indyref2, Scottish Left Review, July/August 2016

Neil Davidson:             Scotland after Brexit, Jacobin magazine, July 2016