Since it’s near bankruptcy in 2009, EU and international creditors have
subjected Greece to a relentless neoliberal experiment in forced economic
restructuring. A series of austerity
packages have resulted in an economic and social collapse reflected in
Depression era economic statistics. Spend
any time outside the well-known tourist areas and the reality of this becomes
all too obvious. From the homeless on the streets of Athens to the rows of
closed shops that you see as you walk round any provincial town. Each one testimony to a small family business
destroyed and lives turned upside down. Listen to the daily TV reports of
crisis related suicides – 4 in the 2 day of writing this. Talk to people even in remote mountain
villages like mine and you hear stories of families separated by migration as
young people leave driven by lack of hope. Or of the elderly and sick
struggling to get essential medicines and treatment. Our local hospital
recently put out an appeal for sheets and blankets. Worse still watch in horror TV reports of the
eviction of a care home forced into bankruptcy by the new foreclosure law. The elderly and frail carried out on to the
street of an Athens’ suburb and left dazed and confused amidst relatives, as bailiffs
seize the property and medical equipment.
How has a government of the
radical left, elected on a clear anti-austerity programme found itself the
agent of such economic and social devastation? Only two days after winning a
massive 60% vote of confidence in last July’s referendum, Alexis Tsipras capitulated
and accepted all the so called “reforms” demanded by Greece’s Troika of
creditor institutions (EU, ECB and IMF) in return for a third tranche of
bailout funding. The scale of its
retreat was staggering. Not only did the Syriza government agree to all
the tax rises, pension cuts and additional austerity measures it had resisted
so powerfully for six months, it also agreed the hand-over of remaining
state-owned assets to a “Privatisation Fund” overseen by Troika
technocrats. In a move that effectively
undermined Greece’s status as an autonomous sovereign state Tsipras accepted a
Troika veto over major aspects of Greek law making.
Tsipras’s climb down has totally transformed the political climate
in Greece. I was lucky enough to witness the events leading up to last year’s
magnificent “Oxi” referendum. The mass demonstration in Athens on July 3, the
politicisation of everyday life as people saw first-hand the class arrogance of
Europe’s political elite, debate and discussion everywhere in cafes, shops
around family meal tables was all reminiscent of the Scottish Independence
referendum; but sharper, more radical. Today
the radical mood has imploded. Voter apathy abounds with recent polls showing
40% would abstain. Even among political
activists there is a worrying level of disillusion and disorientation. Syriza’s popularity has slumped to the
mid-teens, right wing New Democracy has been the main beneficiary polling over
20% recently, whilst the fascist Golden Dawn still lingers in the wings as the
third largest party in parliament.
Syriza’s defeat: Strategic withdrawal or sell-out?
Syriza is the only European example of a radical left government elected
on a programme to directly confront the neoliberal consensus. Understanding the reasons for its retreat is
important. It has implications for the
fight against neoliberalism and right wing nationalism throughout Europe as
well as the future prospects for a radical alternative in Greece. It is simply not enough to denounce Tsipras
as a class collaborator or write off Syriza as “left reformist” and consequently
predestined to fail: the position of many on the UK far left. Syriza’s climb down after the July 2015
referendum needs to be set in context. Neither
Alexis Tsipras nor Syriza were responsible for the financial crisis that
overwhelmed the Greek economy and most of western capitalism! The crisis and what Michael Roberts has
called “the Long Depression” that has followed represent capitalism’s historic
failure to address a long term decline in profitability.
Nor can we blame the Syriza government for the devastation inflicted on
Greece by the series of bailout programmes agreed since 2008 and championed by
Greece’s home-grown oligarchy along with their political and media
friends. In an approach best
characterised by what David Harvey calls “a process of accumulation by
dispossession” Greece has been subject to a massive set of “structural reforms”
aimed at restoring profit rates and
reviving Greek capitalism. These have operated at 4 levels within the Greek
economy:
- The transfer of Greek financial institutions to foreign ownership.
- The destruction of small scale and “inefficient” private sector businesses.
- An increase in the exploitation of labour through draconian labour discipline, mass unemployment, the dismantling of welfare provisions, and replacing workplace protections and collective bargaining rights with precarious working conditions.
- The wholesale privatisation of state assets at knock down prices mainly to foreign capital.
The bailout funds conditional on this reform programme were not used to
ameliorate the resultant social and economic devastation. More than 90% went
directly to German, French, American and other European banks that had indulged
in a frenzy of risky lending to Greek businesses, financial and state
institutions in the run up to the 2008 crisis.
Any criticism of Syriza must accept that Tsipras’s government tried at
least to resist this process of accumulation by dispossession. It was the only Greek government to do so. And
even after it gave in, it retained popular support because of that, and was re-elected
for a second time. Syriza and its
supporters on the left point to this fact and generally argue there was no
alternative but to retreat in the face of European ruling class intransigence,
especially the ECB’s strangulation of the Greek banking system in the weeks
before the July 2015 referendum. This was a strategic retreat to keep open the
possibility of debt relief, whilst trying to mitigate the worst effects of the
new austerity measures. They see
themselves as fighting a classic “war of manoeuvre” which will allow them to
move forward with their radical agenda when the balance of class forces is more
favourable. Syriza’s advocates point to
the fact that, within the austerity programme, Tsipras’s government has been
able to implement some mildly progressive social policies such as legalising
same sex relationships, citizenship for migrant children and a degree of prison
reform.
But this leadership narrative needs to be treated with considerable
scepticism in the light of Syriza’s political trajectory over the last 18
months. Stathis Kouvelakis , a former
member of the party’s central committee argues that initially there was no
“sell out”, but a wrong strategy led to a defeat and subsequently to Syriza’s
political degeneration:
“The retreat at the Eurogroup was not a
betrayal or a sell-out. There was real confrontation. The institutions
wanted to bring the Syriza government to its knees—because it is a real threat
to them. But the Syriza government
followed a wrong strategy—and to overcome that we need to tell the
truth. And the fact that it presented
its retreat almost as a success is in a way more serious than the retreat
itself. It prepares the ground for further defeat.” (My emphasis)
It's hard to disagree with this analysis. Effectively the strategy involved pursuing an anti-austerity programme and demanding debt relief, whilst at the same time maintaining Eurozone membership. It underpinned Tsipras’s election campaign and the approach taken to the subsequent bailout negotiations. To an extent this “wrong strategy” was understandable. For historical reasons staying within the EU and the euro was massively popular amongst the Greek electorate. (It still has majority support in all recent polls). Syriza felt its electoral strategy had to recognise this political reality. At the same time even mainstream economists had criticised the economic illiteracy of Troika demands for ever more austerity and structural reform. Syriza’s strategy was not however just based on Greek political realities and the irrationality of Troika economics. The leadership had a naïve faith in EU “solidarity” and in the potential to reform Eurozone policy making through strategic political alliances within the EU institutions. This meant Tsipras’s and other leaders continually opposed calls from the left to prepare alternative plans should the negotiations go wrong.
As Kouvelakis says, none of this was the product of political degeneration or class collaboration or other far left shibboleth. Much of it did not go uncontested within Syriza at the time. Alternative strategies were possible and were discussed. Debt cancellation and leaving the euro was the most obvious. But this would have meant breaking EU rules and risking a forced Grexit; something Tsipras and key leaders were politically unable to countenance. Those within Syriza who recognised this strategic weakness were not sufficiently united or organised to challenge the leadership strategy.
Any radical left government can expect defeats and set-backs. But a genuinely radical left leadership
should always confront the political circumstances it finds itself in, reassess
the situation and, if forced to retreat, at least do so in a manner which lays
the basis to take the struggle forward in the future. Unfortunately Syriza did not do this. It is this, more than the defeat itself that
marks the beginning of its degeneration as a party of the radical left. Since
then Syriza has become increasingly indistinguishable from mainstream social
democracy. It has accepted its subaltern role.
It has fully and faithfully implemented policies it was elected to
oppose and it has justified them on the basis that “there is no alternative” to
neoliberal solutions.
Finance minister Euclid Tsakalatos’s speech to Syriza’s October
conference perfectly encapsulated what his government has become. Referring to the latest tax rises, pension
cuts and reduction in minimum wages, he acknowledged that the poor would suffer
most. He confirmed that living standards
for the majority of ordinary citizens would fall further and economic growth
would be held back. But he argued that the debt relief that might follow:
“will be a signal to the markets …… and so investors can invest
long-term. This can offset the recessionary measures that we take”.
Effectively a government that came to power promising a radical
redistribution of wealth and power to the benefit of working class people, ends
up defending the standard neoliberal consensus. Tsakalatos justifies sacrifices
by those least able to pay as a price worth paying to placate financial
markets, boost inward investment and restore profit rates.
Sparks of Resistance
Lessons from the Syriza debacle have been hotly debated within the
European and Greek radical left. I would
make only three main points. Firstly a
radical left government is bound to make tactical and strategic mistakes. Dealing with these requires open and honest
assessment and the widest possible democratic debate within the party and the
wider social movements from which it draws its support.
Secondly whatever else we may conclude about Syriza’s experience in
government, it showed that a radical left alternative to neoliberalism can gain
mass popular support. The political consensus of the last 30 years is falling
apart. The result does not have to be
the reactionary populism of Brexit or Trump.
Thirdly and more importantly Greek people continue to suffer and,
despite disorientation and disillusion, continue to resist. Having declined since the mass mobilisations
of 2011 – 12, there are signs that popular opposition is rising again.
Workplace struggle is not yet on the scale of previous years but it has not
gone away. Health
workers took strike action in early October as a result of deteriorating pay
and conditions and in opposition to further cuts in the health service. Prior to that workers struck against the
impact of water privatisation in Thessaloniki and Athens. In a significant
escalation of opposition to Syriza’s austerity measures, the main civil
servants’ union has called a general strike across the public sector for
November 24 and urged private sector unions to join them. State education has been cut to the bone
prompting campaigns by teacher unions for increased staffing and restoration of
funding cuts.
Outside the workplace, pensioners continue to oppose further
pension cuts on top of the 40% reductions imposed over recent years. The sight
of riot police teargassing them and baring their way to parliament during a
demonstration in September was another indication of Syriza’s political
transformation. As was the same police response to thousands of students, trade
unionists and members of radical left groups who defied bans on protests
outside Parliament during Obama’s recent visit. Anti-racist and anti-fascist campaigners have
linked up with trade unionists, those organising refugee support and parent
groups to demand access to state education for refugee children. Local
community solidarity networks providing welfare, health and community services
remain a vital source of support in many working class areas devastated by the
demolition of essential public services. They too are an aspect of resistance
to the processes of “accumulation by dispossession”. Just as importantly they provide “prefigurative”
examples of direct democracy and alternative modes of production and
distribution.
Finally campaigns opposing privatisation have re-emerged. Most notably the one led by Zoe
Constantopoulou, former Speaker of Parliament, aimed at stopping the sale of
the old Athens Airport site to private developers for a huge retail and luxury
residential complex. Former Syriza MP Eleni
Portaliou argues that such campaigns are not just about resisting privatisation. They raise far more important issues about
what is happening in Greece. Greek state assets are being seized and privatised
to pay off “odious and illegitimate” debt. Such “confiscations” are the
clearest possible indication of Greece’s status as an EU “debt colony”. As such
they have the potential to rebuild a much broader social movement and help
reconfigure the radical left in Greece following Syriza’s political collapse.
These and similar struggles demand and deserve international
solidarity. In Scotland we can take immediate steps by getting our union
branches, community campaigns and political organisations to affiliate to and
work with organisations like the Greece Solidarity Campaign, the various
refugee campaigns and others providing material and activist support to the
people of Greece. But the best
solidarity the left can offer is to embrace the vision of collectivism and
resistance represented by these struggles, and build our own mass movement
against both European neoliberalism and the reactionary populism of Trump and
Brexit.
The
struggle of the Greek people is also our struggle. Together we can win!
Το αγονα του Ελληνικού λαού είναι και δικό μας!
Μαζί θα νικήσουμε!
References
Michael Roberts: The Long
depression, Haymarket 2016
David Harvey: 17 Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, Profile
Publishers 2015
Stathis Kouvelakis:
Clinging to Power
Syriza Rise and Fall, NLR Jan / Feb 2016
Eleni Portaliou – Greece a country for sale, Jacobin Magazine Sept
2016
Michael Neradakis – Creditors Destroy Greece, Syriza does not resist
http://www.defenddemocracy.press/
Dimosthenis Papadatos Anagnostopoulos http://rednotebook.gr/
Euclid Tsakalatos – Speech to Second syriza conference, Athens 14
Oct 2016
Alexis Tsipras – Speech to Second Syriza Conference, Athens Oct
2016
Panagiotis Sotiris – The Dream that became a nightmare – Jacobin
Feb 2016
JK Galbraith (https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/imf-greece-debt-restructuring-by-james-k-galbraith-2015-06?barrier=true
Panos Garganos: Socialist Worker (UK) 25/10/2016
